AL DOILEA RAZBOI MONDIAL -INVADAREA FRANTEI

1-În ziua de 10 mai trupele germane invadeaza Olanda,Belgia si Luxemburg,aceste nu rezista mult armate lor germane si se predau.
2.-Flotă aeriană germană pregateste atacuri asupra Frantei,un număr de peste 500 de avioane sunt pregatite de atac în 1940.
3-Franta pregateste apărarea împotriva lui Hitler.
4-Armatele Germane pătrund în Franta la data de 14 mai-1940.
5-La data de 18 mai 1940 în locul numit Dunkort ,armatele germane după mai multe victorii se opresc crezînd ca doar simpla prezenta le vor aduce victoria.
6-Profitand de aceasta situaţie Marea Britanie trimite toate navele de război si comerciale sa aducă din Franta soldaţii care au supravieţuit luptelor cu forţele germane.
7-Peste 350 de mii de soldaţii francezi sunt salvaţi de navele Britanice.
8-La data de 8 iunie 1940 ,Musollinni se aliaza cu Germania si declara razboi Frantei.
9-La data de 10 iunie forţele Germane intra în Paris.
10-Hitler a reuşit sa razbune tratatul umilitor de la Versalies 1919.
11-La data de 12 iunie Hitler pregateste primele atacuri asupra Londrei.
12-Începe altfel bătălia pentru Marea Britanie,o scurta ofensivă a lui Hitler si o prima înfrîngere în război pentru forţele germane.

AL DOILEA RAZBOI MONDIAL.

-Încep o serie de articole despre ceea mai neagră perioada recentă din istoria lumii si mai precis despre al doilea război mondial.
-Încep cu perioada de introducere si motivele care au dus la acest mega-conflict.
-După tratatul de la Varsalies -1918 ,Germania este umilită si obligată sa plătească numeroase daune de război si sa isi reducă armata la doar 100 de mii de soldaţii plus alte cerinţe foarte umilitoare in special pentru un caporal care pe urma va conduce Germania spre răzbunare.
-Acest caporal pe nume Adolf Hitler a jurat răzbunare si urma sa se tina de cuvînt.
-În 1933 Hitler preia puterea totala in Germania si tot odată schimbarea începe imediat.
-Hitler da comanda ca armata sa crească rapid,uriase sume de banii vor fi trimise pentru ca Germania sa aibă ceea mai eficienta si puternica armata din lume.
-Trei uzine de produs tancuri,arme si avioane se vor deschide în Germania iar forţa de munca va cunoaste o uriaşă creştere.
-În 1935 Germania deja avea o armata de peste 2 milioane ,1500 de tancuri plus nouă formată flotă de avioane numita SOIMII CERULUI.
-1n 1938 puterile lumii ii acorda lui Hitler libertatea de a intra în Cehoslovacia pentru a putea anexa teritoriul German .
-Tot în 1938 o alta putere  mai precis Rusia se aliaza cu Germania lui Hitler ,arătînd ca nimeni nu prea se se pună rău cu aceasta forţa.
-În 1939 Hitler intra în Polonia si altfel începe Al -Doilea-Razboi-Mondial.
-Germania vroia răzbunare pentru primul război mondial iar nimeni nu vroia o confruntare directă dar nu era de ales.
-Franta,Anglia,Australia si Canada declara imediat război Germaniei.
-La 29 septembrie Polonia se preda Germaniei.

Al treilea razbou Punic 149-146-I-HR

-După înfrîngerea lui Hannibal criza s-a instalat în Cartagena dar  nu totala prăbuşire.
-În 150 ,după o perioada de prosperitate Cartagena era pregatita de un nou război cu Roma.
-În 149, Roma debarca 2 uriaşe armate în Africa cu scopul precis de a distruge complet complexul Cartagena .
-Timp de doi ani de zile ,Cartagena a respins orice atac al armate lor romane conduse de nepotul lui Scipio Africanul mai precis de generalul Scipio-Anelionius.
-În timpul acestui război ,puterea Romei era în plină dezvoltare si mai precis ceea militară .
-Spre deosebirea de primele doua războaie,Roma foloseste elefanţi si noi tactici ,tactici prin cu care surprinde armata Catagena.
-În final în anul 146 ,Roma cucereste definitiv Cartagena ,o arde si i-a majoritatea populat iei în sclaviei si rade după fata pămîntului acest străvechi si puternic imperiu.

AL DOILEA RAZBOI PUNIC 218-201

-După primul război punic Cartagena reuşea sa isi revină si acest lucru imediat s-a observat la Roma.
-Liderul Cartagenei Hastrubal reusea sa ridice o nouă armata si sa aducă Spania în controlul cartagenilor.
-Acesta a fost asasinat dar imediat a fost urmat la conducere de fiul lui cel mare Hannibal care urma sa devină unul din cei mai mari generali din istorie si unul din cele mai mari coşmaruri din istoria Romei.
-Hannbal a pornit imediat războiul contra Romei cucerind oraşul Saguntum in anul 219.
-Roma declara imediat razboi lui Hannibal si trimite doua armate ,una in Galia si una in Spania.
-Hannibal atunci pleacă din Spania cu 55000 de oameni ,10000 de calareti ,40 de elefanti de lupta si pleacă pe uscat spre Roma.
-Trece Pirinei si cu ajutorul Galiei trece Alpi cu mari eforturi in armata sa.

-În anul 217 înfrînge o uriaşă armata romană langă lacul Trasimenus ,chiar luînd viaţa consului de la acel timp.

-În drumul sau în Italia reuşeşte numeroase victorii asupra armate lor romane si i-a obligat pe acestia la decizi dramatice.

-Roma pune un dictator militar mai precis pe Fabius Maximus care impune o tactică defensivă în războiul cu Hannibal.

-În anul 216 la Cannae Hannibal înfrînge o armata romană de 85000 de soldaţii si aplica cea mai dureroasa înfrîngere suferită .

-Cu toata acesta Hannibal nu ataca Roma si acest lucru ii salvează .

-Roma trimite doua armate ,una în Spania unde înfrînge armatele lui Hannibal care trebuia sa vină în ajutorul lui în Italia ,cea de-a doua a fost trimisă în Africa unde matură toata rezistentele lui Hannibal.

-În anul 202 la Zama Hannibal este invins de Scipio-Africanul  si este obligat sa se retraga in afara Cartagenei.

-Prin pacea care se încheie după al doilea război punic (201 î.Hr.), Cartaginacedează romanilor toate posesiunile ei din Spania. De asemenea, trebuia să plătească o mare despăgubire de război Romei – 10.000 de talanţi în decursul a 10 ani –, şi să-i predea întreaga ei flotă cu excepţia a 10 trireme; o parte din teritoriile Cartaginei erau date lui Masinissa, regelui Numidiei, care devenise aliatul Romei. Cartagina nu avea voie să înceapă război în afara Africii, iar în Africa doar cu aprobarea Romei. TeritoriulSiracuzei devine parte din provincia Sicilia.

      În urma acestei păci, Cartagina şi-a pierdut complet supremaţia ei în bazinul de apus al Mării Mediterane; locul ei este luat de Roma, care devine un mare stat din Mediterana.

POMPEY THE GREAT (106-48 B.C.)

Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus one of the great statesmen and generals of the late Roman Republic, a triumvir (61-54 BC), the associate and later opponent of Julius Caesar. He was initially called Magnus (the Great) by his troops in Africa (82-81 BC).

Early career.

Pompey belonged to the senatorial nobility, although his family first achieved the office of consul only in 141. Fluent in Greek and a lifelong and intimate friend of Greek literati, he must have had the normal education of a young Roman nobleman; but his early experience on the staff of his father, Pompeius Strabo, did much to form his character, develop his military capabilities, and arouse his political ambition. The family possessed lands in Picenum, in eastern Italy, and a numerous body of clients, which Strabo greatly enlarged in the year of his consulship. In a civil war (88-87) between the rival generals Lucius Sulla and Gaius Marius, Strabo defied Sulla and favoured the Marians and a fellow general.

After his father's death, however, Pompey detached himself from the Marians. A report that he was "missing" in Cinna's army, when it was embarking for the Balkans to deal with Sulla, led to the lynching of Cinna by his troops (84). Pompey's part in this mutiny is unclear; he next appears with three legions recruited in Picenum, joining Sulla as an independent ally in the campaign to recover Rome and Italy from the Marians (83). Sulla made ample use of his youthful ally's military abilities. Pompey married Sulla's stepdaughter. On Sulla's orders the Senate gave Pompey the job of recovering Sicily and Africa from the Marians—a task he completed in two lightning campaigns (82-81). Pompey ruthlessly executed Marian leaders who had surrendered to him. To his enemies he was Sulla's butcher; to the troops he was "Imperator" and "Magnus." From Africa Pompey demanded that a triumph be given him in Rome; he refused to disband his army and appeared at the gates of Rome, obliging Sulla to yield to his demand. After Sulla's abdication, Pompey supported the renegade Sullan Marcus Lepidus for the consulship of 78. Once in office Lepidus attempted revolution, and Pompey promptly joined the forces of law and order against him. The rising crushed, however, Pompey refused to disband his army, which he used to bring pressure on the Senate to send him with proconsular power to join Metellus Pius in Spain against the Marian leader Sertorius.

The reconquest of Spain taxed Pompey's military skill and strained his own and the state's resources to the utmost. In the end it was he, not Metellus, who imposed on Spain a settlement reflecting and promoting his own political aims. His policy was one of reconciliation and rehabilitation. His personal authority and patronage now covered Spain, southern Gaul, and northern Italy. Unlike Metellus, Pompey took his army back to Italy with him, ostensibly to assist in putting down a slave revolt led by Spartacus, but in reality to secure a triumph and election to the consulship for 70. The nobles whom Sulla had restored to power had proved to be more corrupt and incompetent than ever. Pompey promised reforms at home and abroad. A bargain was struck with his rival Marcus Licinius Crassus, the two were jointly elected consuls, and Pompey was given another triumph.

Reorganization of the East.

Although the nobles were to continue to dominate the consular elections in most years, the real sources of power henceforth lay outside of Italy. Extraordinary commands would have to be created if Rome was to recover control of the sea from pirates. It was Pompey who benefitted most from the restoration of tribunician initiative. After his consulship, he waited in Rome while rival nobles undermined the position of Lucius Licinius Lucullus, who was campaigning against Mithradates in Anatolia, and made halfhearted attempts to deal with the pirates. Finally, in 67, the tribune Aulus Gabinius forced a bill through the popular assembly empowering Pompey to settle the pirate problem.

Pompey was still in the East, resettling pirates as peaceful farmers, when in Rome another tribune, Gaius Manilius, carried through, against weakened opposition, a bill appointing Pompey to the command against Mithradates, with full powers to make war and peace and to organize the whole Roman East (66). Pompey displaced Lucullus and lost no time defeating Mithradates in Asia Minor. After the death of Mithradates in 63, Pompey was free to plan the consolidation of the eastern provinces and frontier kingdoms. For 6,000 talents he set up King Tigranes in Armenia as a friend and ally of Rome—and as his own protégé. Pompey rejected the Parthian king's request to recognize the Euphrates as the limit of Roman control and extended the Roman chain of protectorates to include Colchis, on the Black Sea, and the states south of the Caucasus. In Anatolia, he created the new provinces of Bithynia-Pontus and Cilicia. He annexed Syria and left Judaea as a dependent, diminished temple state. The organization of the East remains Pompey's greatest achievement. His sound appreciation of the geographical and political factors involved enabled him to impose an overall settlement that was to form the basis of the defensive frontier system and was to last, with few important changes, for more than 500 years.

Pompey's power and prestige were at their height in December 62, when he landed at Brundisium (Brindisi) and dismissed the army. His third triumph (61) trumpeted the grandeur of his achievement. The following decade was the period of his ascendancy in Italy, an ascendancy that was to be eroded through Caesar's growing military power and gradual capture of Pompey's worldwide clientelae, from the power base Caesar, in turn, created in northern Italy and Gaul. Pompey's inveterate enemies in Rome were the Optimates, the inner ring of nobles, not Crassus or Caesar, who had merely tried to steal the limelight in Pompey's absence and to manoeuvre into a better position for bargaining with their former political ally. The nobles meanwhile had gradually reasserted their dominance in Rome and hampered attempts to alleviate the condition of Italy and the Roman populace. Once back in Italy, Pompey avoided siding with popular elements against the Optimates. He was no revolutionary. He wanted all classes to recognize him as first citizen, available for further large-scale services to the state. He had divorced his third wife, Mucia, and now proposed to ally himself by marriage to the party of the young senatorial leader Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger. But the nobles were closing their ranks against him, and his offer was rebuffed. Lucullus and others were determined to prevent the en bloc ratification of Pompey's eastern settlement and to reject his demand for land for his veterans.

The First Triumvirate.

Help came only when Caesar returned from his governorship in Spain. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar formed the unofficial and at first secret First Triumvirate. It was to become more than a mere election compact. It would strain all the resources of the triumvirs to wrest one consulship from the Optimates; their continued solidarity was essential if they were to secure what Caesar gained for them in 59. Caesar, for his part, wanted a long-term command. Pompey, who now married Caesar's daughter, Julia, saw Caesar as his necessary instrument. Caesar, once consul, immediately forced through a land bill and, shortly after, another appropriating public lands in Campania. Once he had secured a five-year command in Illyria and Gaul he could be relied on to take off a large proportion of Pompey's discharged troops and give them further opportunities for profitable employment.

Pompey solved the problem of Rome's grain supply with his usual efficiency, but the nobles kept up their opposition. The year 56 was a critical one for the triumvirs. The nobles concocted religious impediments to prevent the dispatch of Pompey on a military mission to Egypt, while Publius Clodius contrived to persuade Pompey that Crassus had designs on his life. An attempt was made to suspend Caesar's law for the distribution of Campanian land.

Alarmed at Pompey's suspicions and truculence, Crassus set off to meet Caesar at Ravenna, and Caesar in turn came to the limit of his province at Luca to meet Pompey. The Luca conference (56) prepared the ground for the next phase of triumviral cooperation: Pompey and Crassus were to secure election to the consulship for 55, for they, too, wanted five-year commands in the provinces, while Caesar's command was to be renewed for another five years. The three secured their ends by violence and corruption after a prolonged struggle. Early in 55 Pompey and Crassus were at last elected consuls, with most of the lesser magistracies going to their supporters. Caesar obtained the extension of his command, while Pompey and Crassus received commands in Spain and Syria, respectively. Pompey could stay on in Italy and govern his provinces by deputies. But the triumvirate was coming to an end. The death of Julia (54) destroyed the strongest bond between Pompey and Caesar, and Crassus suffered disastrous defeat and death in Mesopotamia. The triumvirate existed no longer; but Pompey as yet showed no inclination to break with Caesar.

Civil war.

Meanwhile, from outside the walls of Rome, Pompey watched the anarchy in the city becoming daily more intolerable. He was prepared to wait without committing himself until the Optimates found an alliance with him unavoidable. He refused further offers from Caesar of a marriage alliance. There was talk in Rome as early as 54 of a dictatorship for Pompey. Street violence made it impossible to hold the elections. In January 52 Clodius was killed by armed followers of Titus Annius Milo, whose candidacy for the consulship was being bitterly opposed by both Pompey and Clodius. Now both factions exploded into even greater violence. The senate house was burnt down by the mob. With no senior magistrates in office, the Senate had to call on Pompey to restore order. It was the hour he had waited for. He speedily summoned troops from Italy. The nobles would not have him as dictator; they thought it safer to appoint him sole consul.

Pompey's legislation of 52 reveals his genuine interest in reform and the duplicity of his conduct towards Caesar. He reformed procedure in the courts and produced a panel of respectable jurors. A severe law against bribery at elections was made retrospective to 70 and, for all Pompey's protests, was rightly taken by Caesar's friends as aimed at him. Another useful law enforced a five-year interval between tenure of magistracies in Rome and assumption of provincial commands. But this law and another, which prohibited candidature in absence, effectively destroyed the ground of Caesar's expectation that he should become designated consul, and so safe from prosecution, before he had to disband his army in Gaul. Several attempts were made in the years 51-50 to recall Caesar before the expiration of his second term in Gaul. They were frustrated by the assertiveness of Caesar's faction and agents in Rome. Pompey, for all his growing fear and suspicion of Caesar's ambitions, did not come out openly against Caesar until late in 51, when he suddenly made clear his intentions. He declared that he would not consider the suggestion that Caesar should become designated consul while still in command of his army. His proposals for a compromise date for Caesar's recall were unacceptable to Caesar, whose sole resource now was to use the wealth he had accumulated in Gaul to buy men who could obstruct his enemies in the Senate. When war came, the Senate was evenly divided between Caesar and Pompey. The consulars were solidly for Pompey, although they saw him simply as the lesser evil. Late in 50 the consul Gaius Marcellus, failing to induce the Senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, visited Pompey with the consuls designate and placed a sword in his hands. Pompey accepted their invitation to raise an army and defend the state. Caesar continued to offer compromise solutions while preparing to strike. On Jan. 7, 49, the Senate finally decreed a state of war. Four days later Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

Pompey's strategic plan was to abandon Rome and Italy to Caesar and rely on his command of the sea and the resources of the East to starve out the Caesarians in Italy; but he did not have the disciplined loyalty and full cooperation of his Optimate allies, and Caesar's swift advance southward only just failed to prevent his withdrawal from Italy. Across the Adriatic at Dyrrhachium the wisdom of Pompey's strategy became clear. Caesar, after a hazardous crossing in pursuit, found himself cut off from his base in Italy by sea and facing superior land forces. Pompey, however, eventually had to abandon his naval blockade of the rest of Caesar's forces in Brundisium and failed to prevent their crossing to join Caesar. Caesar's army was repulsed in an assault on Pompey's camp at Dyrrhachium and, failing a quick decision in the West, Caesar was obliged to move eastwards into Thessaly. Pompey followed and joined forces with the Senate's army there under Scipio, rendering Caesar's position untenable. At this juncture, Pompey, under pressure from his Optimate allies, decided for battle, a sensible enough decision if his opponent had not been a commander of genius. Pompey suffered a disastrous defeat on the plain of Pharsalus (48). He fled from his camp as the enemy stormed it and made his way to the coast. His supporters were to rally and involve Caesar in strenuous fighting in Africa, Spain, and the East for three more years; but Pompey did not live to play a part in this struggle. Hurried on by Caesar's rapid pursuit, he lost contact with his own fleet. He moved on southward to Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt. He decided to land at Pelusium and seek the assistance of Ptolemy, his former client. The King marched down to the coast, ostensibly to welcome him; but he and his counsellors had chosen not to risk offending the victorious Caesar. Pompey's small squadron lay offshore while Pompey, bidding farewell to his wife, Cornelia, complied with an insidious invitation to enter, with several companions, a small boat sent to bring him to land. As he prepared to step ashore he was treacherously struck down and killed (Sept. 28, 48 BC).

Assessment.

Pompey's name cast a lasting shadow. His end inspired some of Lucan's finest verses. In the empire he acquired official respectability, and the greatness of his achievement was fully appreciated by the great writers. But there are few clear-headed or unbiassed accounts of Pompey by his own contemporaries. Caesar would have his readers believe that he wrote of Pompey more in sorrow than in anger; his propaganda was discreet and subtly damaging to his rival's reputation. Cicero's veering, day-to-day judgments of Pompey reveal his inability to see clearly through the distorting medium of his own vanity. The inflated eulogies of Pompey in Cicero's speeches are punctured by his persistent sniping at him in his letters. Yet he looked up to him for leadership and, in the moment of decision, joined him. But Pompey was neither a revolutionary nor a reactionary, willing to wreck the fabric of the commonwealth for the advantage of self or class. He expected a voluntary acceptance of his primacy but was to discover that the methods he had used to get his commands had permanently alienated the dominant nobility. So year after year he had to play a passive role, covertly intriguing or waiting for successive occasions to arise that would force them to accept his leadership. Some thought his waiting game duplicity, others, sheer political incompetence. He was an ineffective politician, not from incapacity for intrigue or ruthless action but from lack of candour and consistency in speech and action.

As a military leader, Pompey fell short of real greatness, lacking Caesar's genius, his dynamism and panache, and his geniality in personal relationships. He was circumspect and thorough—the perfect administrator. His vision of empire was no narrower than Caesar's. Like many a more recent imperialist, he was satisfied with the ideal of efficient and clean-handed administration and justice, and many of his contemporaries believed that he went far to achieve that aim in his own practice. Pompey, the wealthiest man of his age, invested his millions prudently; his landed estates were distributed throughout Italy in manageable units. For all the extravagance of his triumphal shows and the inexcusable heartlessness of the contests in slaughter with which he entertained the populace, he was a plain-living man, friend and admirer of the Stoic Panaetius. His third wife, Mucia, bore him two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus, and a daughter, Pompeia, before he divorced her for infidelity (62). Julia was the wife he loved most dearly; Cornelia outlived him and mourned his death. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Article)

Primul razboi punic [264-241]

Unul din cele mai sangeroase războaie din istoria lumi ,mai precis Roma vs Cartagena,aceste doua puteri sau luptat mai bine de 3 războaie pentru a determina cine deţine supremaţia în Africa,Spania,Italia si mai ales pe Marea Mediterana.
În acest prim articol o sa rezum primul război punic ,

-Prin anexarea Italiei de sud, Roma se învecina acum cu Sicilia, insulă foarte bogată, care deţinea o poziţie importantă pentru navigaţie în Marea Mediterană. Sicilia era împărţită între oraşele greceşti, în frunte cu Siracuza, care stăpîneau partea de răsărit a insulei, şi cartaginezi, care stăpîneau părţile de apus.
Atunci, mamertinii au cerut ajutor Romei, care s-a grăbit astfel să intervină alungându-i pe cartaginezi din Messana. Atunci Cartagina a declarat război romanilor.

Bătălia navală de la Mylae - 260 î.Hr.
-o prima mare bătălie navala în care cele doua forţe arunca toata elita cu un avantaj în nave

inclinat spre Cartagena,dar un avantaj care urma sa fie repede anihilat de Roma.

.
-      În faţa primejdiei comune, cei doi vechi adversari din Sicilia, siracuzanii şi cartaginezii, au încheiat o alianţă, dar romanii i-au silit în scurtă vreme pe cei dintâi să ceară pace. Apoi au continuat lupta împotriva cartaginezilor; aceştia aveau o puternică flotă de război, cu care punea în primejdie coastele Italiei. Pentru a-i înfrânge pe cartaginezi, romanii au construit un mare număr de corăbii (copii ale unui vas punic cu 5 vâsle găsit de romani după ce a eşuat), prevăzute cu o punte cu cârlig de fier, cu care prindeau corăbiile duşmane pentru a le reţine; apoi, pe bordul corăbiilor începea o luptă ca pe uscat. Folosind o astfel de tactică, flota romană condusă de consulul Duilius i-a învins laMylae (260 î.Hr.) pe cartaginezi.
-

      Cu ajutorul aceste ia romanii reuşea să-i lichideze pe piraţii iliri de pe coasta Dalmaţiei (229-228 î.Hr.), întinzându-şi autoritatea lor pe coasta Mării Adriatice până la graniţele Macedoniei şi Greciei. Între timp, armatele romane au obţinut împotriva galilor victoria de la Clastidium (222 î.Hr.) şi au cucerit cetatea acestora Mediolanum. Astfel întreaga Galie Cisalpină a trecut în stăpânirea Romei. Sunt întemeiate noi colonii (Cremona, Mutina, Placentia) şi construită Via Flaminia. În felul acesta, puterea romană se întindea, în nord, până la Alpi.

Primul război punic a reprezentat pentru Roma puterea,si-a dat seama ca deţine o uriaşă rezerva de oameni,banii si mai ales experti militari de care se poate bucura mult timp si în special de care se poate folosi in a zdrobi orice duşman.

Generalul Antonescu si situatia din Romania 1940-1944

România trecea printr-o perioada foarte grea în perioada 1930-1939 cu numeroase lupte pentru putere si cu venirea războiul care prindea culoare  mai mare în Europa.

Antonescu era un nume respectat în armata ,mai precis prin faptele sale din primul război mondial a fost numit în 1931 şef peste toata armata dar a stat doar un an din cauza situaţiei pe care o avea cu Regele Carol al 2. 

Romania era un vulcan atunci,Carol al 2 numai avea practic nici o putere deplina si lucrul asta se vedea în situaţia economică,culturală si mai ales militară.În 1938 toate partidele de frunte din Romania si mai precis,P.N.T ,P.N.L,P.L.R-partidul legionar cereau plecarea lui Carol si instaurarea unui regim care sa poată sa controleze ce va veni peste tara.

Carol al doilea pleacă în 1939 si lasă puterea pe mană lui Antonescu ,acesta fiind rugat chiar de liderii partidelor politice sa preia aceasta putere si mai precis de Iuliu Maniu,I.C.Bratianu,Nicolae Iorga.

Antonescu vine la putere dar nu singur ,cu el au sosit si legionari care fuseseră principali aliaţi ai lui Antonescu ,mai ales după ce Antonescu a fost împotriva executari lui Zelea Condreanu in 1938.

După începerea celui de-al doilea război mondial în 1939 ,Romania a decis sa între de partea Germaniei lui Hitler si sa lupte împotriva Rusiei lui Stalin care era hotarata sa distrugă orice democraţie în Europa ,dar acesta hotarare a adus încă de la început numeroase nemulţumiri în Romania.

Încă din 1940 în Romania situaţia era foarte incinsa datorită liderilor partidelor politice si Maresalul-Antonescu care nu se înţelegea deloc .Liderii acestor partide vroiau ieşirea Romaniei din tabără-Germana si trecerea de partea Aliatilor ,lucru pe care Antonescu il refuza pe buna dreptate inca de la inceput.

Între cele doua tabere se trimite au scrisori ,scrisori pe care fiecare parte le înţelegea cum doreau si le foloseau ca arme împotriva taberei adverse mai tîrziu.

Antonescu era legat intr-o lupta pentru reintregirea Romaniei ,o lupta pe care partidele politice au parasito si în 1918 si în 1939 cand Carol al 2 a abdicat,acest lucru a fost unul foarte greu de digerat de Antonescu si de populatia ţării din ambele momente.

Situaţia era neplăcută si datorită legionarilor care rezolvau toate probleme prin sînge ,aceast lucru a fost criticat de toata lumea si aici mă refer la General,Partidele Politice si de Curtea Regala.

După revolta legionară din 1942 si cu pierderea pe rînd a Germaniei din frontul mondial, în Romania situaţia era critică si aici vreau sa zic ca hidoasă clasa politică din Romania vroia sa ducă tara sub domnia lui Stalin.

Domnul Maniu era intr-o situaţie foarte tensionată cu Maresalul Antonescu ,cei doi au avut replici dure încă din 1940 ,iar pană în 1944 cînd situaţia era clară ,Germania pierdea războiul si în Romania era în plină acţiune lovitură de stat,o lovitură de stat ce a avut loc la 23 august 1944.